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[Crim. No. 5892. In Bank. Oct. 11, 1956.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. STEPHEN STUART, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Intent.-Union of act and intent or criminal 
negligence is an invariable element of every crime unless it is 
excluded expressly or by necessary implicatiou. (Pen. Code, 
§20.) 
[2] Drugs and Druggists-Pure Drugs Act-Adulteration and Mis-
branding.-Public welfare statutes such as Health & Saf. 
Code, § 26280, prohibiting the preparation or sale of an adulter-
ated or misbranded drug, are not ordinarily governed by Pen. 
Code, § 20, and therefore call for the sanctions imposed 
though the prohibited acts are committed without criminal 
intent or criminal negligence. 
[S] Homicide-Manslaughter-Lack of Due Caution and Circum-
Bpection.-Pen. Code, § 192, defining manslaughter, is governed 
by Pen. Code, § 20, making unity of act and intent essential 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 85 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal 
Law, § 24. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 12 et seq. 
[3] Homicide through culpable negligence, note, 161 A.L.R. 10. 
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 152 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§ 209 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 16; [2, 8] Drugs and 
Druggists, § 1(1); [3] Homicide, § 27; [4-6] Homicide, § 26; [7] 
Statutes, § US. 
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to constitute a crime, and the phrase "without due caution and 
circumspection" in § 192 is therefore the equivalent of criminal 
negligence. 
[4] ld.-Manslaughter-Unlawful Act not Amounting to Felony.-
Since Pen. Code, § 20, making unity of act and intent essential 
to constitute a crime, applies to the phrase "unlawful act" in 
Pen. Code, § 192, defining manslaughter, a pharmacist's act in 
filling a prescription calling for the addition of pure sodium 
citrate, by adding a compound from a bottle labeled sodium 
citrate which contained a mixture of sodium citrate and sodium 
nitrite, must be committed with criminal intent or CJ,"iminal 
negligence to be an unlawful act within the meaning of § 192; 
and by virtue of its application to both phrases, § 20 pre-
cludes the incongruity of imposing on the morally innocent 
the penalty (Pen. Code, § 193) appropriate only for the 
culpable. 
[5] ld.-Manslaughter-Unlawful Act not Amounting to Felony.-
To be an "unlawful act" within the meaning of Pen. Code, 
§ 192, the act in question must be dangerous to human life 
or safety and meet the conditions of Pen. Code, § 20, requiring 
unity of act and intent to constitute a crime. 
[6] ld.-Manslaughter-Unlawful Act not Amounting to Felony.-
Where a pharmacist, in filling a prescriptioJl calling for the 
addition of pure sodium citrate, did not know and could not 
reasonably be expected to know that a sodihm citrate bottle 
contained nitrite, the conditions of Pen. Cod~, § 20, requiring 
unity of act and intent to constitute a crim-e, were not met 
and there was therefore lacking the culpability necessary to 
make the act an unlawful act within the lueaning of Pen. 
Code, § 192, defining manslaughter, and he co,tld not properly· 
be convicted of such offense because use of the medicine caused 
a child's death due to the presence of sodiUDt nitrite. 
[7] Statutes-Construction-Penal Statutes.-Whan language rea-
sonably susceptible of two constructions is Qsed in a penal 
law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to 
the offender will be adopted, particularly where one of the 
proposed constructions would impose absolute criminal liability 
and make a felony of an act that involves no culpability. 
[8] Drugs and Druggists-Criminal Offenses-Deviation From Pre-
scription.-The purpose of Pen. Code, § 380, making it a 
felony if death results because a dealer in drugs or medicines 
wilfully or ignorantly deviates from the terms of a prescrip-
tion, is to enforce "care and caution" on the part of dealers 
in drugs, and to protect the pUblic against one who dispenses 
drugs in ignorance of their properties and proper uses; it was 
not the purpose to impose criminal liability without fault for 
accidents having no relation to failure to use the knowledge 
and skill required for dispensing drup. 
) 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Stanley Mosk, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for manslaughter and for violation of Pen. 
Code, § 380, prohibiting a druggist from deviating from a 
prescription. Judgment of conviction reversed. 
John N. Frolich, William Levin and F. Bruce McMullen 
for Appellant. 
Dean M. McCann as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Edward M. 
Belasco, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was charged by information 
with manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192) and the violation of 
section 380 of the Penal Code. He was convicted of both 
offenses by the court sitting without a jury. His motions for 
a new trial and for dismissal (Pen. Code, § 1385) were denied, 
sentence was suSpended, and he was placed on probation for 
two years. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and 
the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
Defendant was licensed as a pharmacist by this state in 
1946 and has practiced here since that time. He holds a 
B.S. degree in chemistry from Long Island University and a 
B.S. degree in pharmacy from Columbia University. In 
April, 1954, he was employed as a pharmacist by the Ethical 
Drug Company in Los Angeles. 
On July 16, 1954, he filled a prescription for Irvin Sills. 
It had been written by Dr. D. M. Goldstein for Sills' 8-day-old 
child. It called for "sodium phenobarbital, grains eight. So-
dium eitraie, drams three. Simple Syrup, ounces two. 
Aqua peppermint, ounces one. Aqua distillate QS, ounces 
four. " Defendant assembled the necessary drugs to fill 
the prescription. He believed that the simple syrup called 
for was unavailable and therefore used syrup of orange. The 
ingredients were incompatible, and the syrup of orange pre-
cipitated out the phenobarbital. Defendant then telephoned 
Dr. Goldstein to ask if he could use some other flavoring. Dr. 
Goldstein told him that since it was midnight, if he could not 
find any simple syrup "it would be just as well to use another 
substance, elixir mesopine, P .B. " Defendant spoke to a clerk 
) 
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and learned that there was simple syrup behind the counter. 
He mixed the prescription with this syrup, put a label on the 
bottle according to the prescription, and gave it to Sills. 
Sills returned home, put a teaspoonful of the prescription in 
the baby's milk and gave it to the baby. The baby died a few 
hours later. 
Defendant stipulated that there was nitrite in the pre-
f>cription bottle and that "the cause of death was methemog-
lobinemia caused by the ingestion of nitrite." When he com-
pounded the prescription, there was a bottle containing sodium 
nitrite on the shelf near a bottle labeled sodium citrate. He 
testified that at no time during his employment at the Ethical 
Drug Company had he filled any prescription calling for 
sodium nItrite and that he had taken the prescribed three 
drams of sodium citrate from the bottle so labeled. 
On August 11, 1954, another pharmacist employed by the 
Ethical Drug Company filled a prescription identical with 
the Sills' prescription. He obtained the sodium citrate from 
the same bottle used by defendant. The prescription was 
given to an infant. The infant became ill but recovered. 
In the opinion of Dr. Goldstein, it was suiIering from 
methemoglobinemia. An analysis of this prescription by a 
lIniversity of Southern California chemist disclosed that it 
contained 5.4 grams of sodium nitrite per 100 cc's and 4.5 
grams of sodium citrate per 100 cc's. 
An analysis made by the staff of the head toxocologist for 
the Los Angeles County coroner of the contents of the bottle 
given to Sills disclosed that it contained 1.33 drams of sodium 
citrate and 1.23 of sodium nitrite. An analysis made by 
Biochemical Procedures, Incorporated, a laboratory, of a 
sample of the contents of the bottle labeled sodium citrate 
disclosed that it contained 38.9 milligrams of nitrite per gram 
of material. Charles Covet, one of the owners of the Ethical 
Drug Company, testified that on the 17th or 18th of October, 
-ltJ54, he emptied the contents of the sodium citrate bottle, 
washed the bottle but not its cap, and put in new sodium 
citrate. A subsequent analysis of rinsings from the cap gave 
strong positive tests for nitrite. Covet also testified that when 
he purchased an interest in the company in April, 1950, the 
bottle labeled sodium citrate was part of the inventory, that 
no one had put additional sodium citrate into the bottle from 
that time until he refilled it after the death of the Sills child 
Jand that he had never seen any other supply of sodium 
citrate iD. the store. 
) 
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There is nothing in the reeord to indicate that the contents 
of the bottle labeled sodium citrate could have been identified 
as containing sodium nitrite without laboratory analysis. There 
was testimony that at first glance sodium citrate and sodium 
nitrite are identical in appearance, that in form either may 
consist of small colorless crystals or white crystalline powder, 
that the granulation of the crystals may vary with the manu-
facturer, and that there may be a slight difference in color 
between the two. The sUbstance from the bottle labeled sodium 
citrate was exhibited to the court, but no attempt was made to 
compare it with unadulterated sodium citrate or sodium ni-
trite. A chemist with Biochemical Procedures, Incorporated, 
testified that the mixture did not appear to be homogeneous 
but that from visual observation alone he could not identify 
the crystals as one substance or the other. Defendant testified 
that he had no occasion before JUly 16th to examine or fill 
any prescription from the sodium citrate bottle. 
No evidence whatever was introduced that would justify 
an inference tha t defendant knew or should have known that 
the bottle labeled sodium citrate contained sodium nitrite. 
On the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows conclusively 
that defendant was morally entirely innocent and that only 
because of a reasonable mistake or unavoidable accident was 
the prescription filled with a substance containing sodium 
nitrite. [1] Section 20 of the Penal Code l makes the union 
of act and intent or criminal negligence an invariable element 
of every crime unless it is excluded expressly or by necessary 
implication. (People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.?d 798, 801 [299 
P.2d 850].) Moreover, section 26 of the Penal Code lists 
among the persons incapable of committing crimes" [p] ersons 
. who committed the act or made the omission charged under 
an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal 
intent" (subd. 4), and" [p]ersons who committed the act 
or made the omission charged through misfortune or by acci-
dent, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, 
or culpable negligence." (Subd. 6; see also Pen. Code, 
§§ 195, 199.) The question is thus presented whether a 
person can be convicted of manslaughter or a violation of 
section 380 of the Penal Code in the absence of any evidence 
of criminal intent or criminal negligence. 
The answer to this question as it relates to the conviction 
S"In every crime or public offense there must exist a lUlion, or ,joint 
operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence." 
) 
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of manslaughterS depends on whether or not defendant com-
mitted an "unlawful act" within the meaning of section 192 
of the Penal Code when he filled the prescription. The 
attorney general contends that even if he had no criminal 
intent and was not criminally negligent, defendant violated 
section 26280 of the Health and Safety Code and therefore 
committed an unlawful act within the meaning of section 192 
of the Penal Code. 
Section 26280 of the Health and Safety Code provides: 
"The manufacture, production, preparation, compounding, 
packing, selling, offering for sale, advertising or keeping for 
sale within the State of California ... of any drug or device 
which is adulterated or misbranded is prohibited. "8 In view 
of the analysis of the contents of the prescription bottle and 
the bottle labeled sodium citrate and defendant's stipulation, 
there can be no doubt that he prepared, compounded, and 
sold an adulterated and misbranded drug. 
[2] Because of the great danger to the public health and 
safety that the preparation, compounding or sale of adulter-
ated or misbranded drugs entails, the public interest in 
demanding that those who prepare, compound, or sell drugs 
make certain that they are not adulterated or misbranded, 
and the belief that although an occasional nonculpable offender 
may be punished, it is necessary to incur that risk by imposing 
strict liability to prevent the escape of great numbers of 
culpable offenders, public welfare statutes like section 26280 
are not ordinarily governed by section 20 of the Penal Code 
and therefore call for the sanctions imposed even though the 
prohibited acts are committed without criminal intent or 
criminal negligence. (See Peop~e v. VogeZ, fttpra, 46 Ca1.2d 
·"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without 
malille. It is of three kinds: 
1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 
2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful alit, not amounting 
to felony; or in the commission of a lawful alit whieh might produce 
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and cirllumspee-
tion; provided that this subdivision shall not spply to allts committed 
in the driving of a vehillle. • • ." (Pen. Code, § 192.) 
·"A drug shall be deemed to be adulterated ••• (4) if any substanlle 
has been (a) mixed or paeked therewith so as to reduce its quality or 
strength; or (b) substituted wholly or in part therefor." (Health & 
Saf. Code, ~ 26235.) 
.. The term 'misbranded' shall apply to all drugs or devices, the 
package or label of which bears any statement, design, or emblem regard-
ing such article or the inlrredients or snb~tane.es contained therein which 
shall be false or misleading in any particular .••• " (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 26240.) 
) 
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798, 801, note 2; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. 
L.Rev. 55,72-75; Hall, Prolegomena To.A. Science of Oriminol 
Law, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 549, 563-569.) 
[3] It does not follow, however, that such acts, committed 
without criminal intent or criminal negligence, are unlawful 
acts within the meaning of section 192 of the Penal Code, 
for it is settled that this section is governed by section 20 
of the Penal Code. Thus, in People v. Penny, 44 Ca1.2d 
861,877-880 [285 P.2d 926], we held that "there was nothing 
to show that the Legislature intended to except section 192 
of the Penal Code from the operation of section 20 of the same 
code" and that the phrase "without due caution and circum-
spection" in section 192 was therefore the equivalent of 
criminal negligence. [4] Since section 20 also applies to the 
phrase "unlawful act," the act in question must be com-
mitted with criminal intent or criminal negligence to be an 
unlawful act within the meaning of section 192. By virtue 
of its application to both phrases, section 20 precludes the 
incongruity of imposing on the morally innocent the same 
penalty (Pen. Code, § 193) appropriate only for the culpable. 
Words such as "unlawful act, not amounting to felony" have 
been included in most definitions of manslaughter since the 
time of Blackstone (4 Bl. Comm. Homicide § 191; see Riesen-
feld, Negligent Homicide: .A. Study in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 21~22) and even since the time of Lord 
Hale, "unlawful act" as it pertains to manslaughter has been 
interpreted as meaning an act that aside from its unlawfulness 
was of such a dangerous nature as to justify a conviction of 
manslaughter if done intentionally or without due caution. 
(See Moreland, Law of Homicide 186-187, 244, citing 1 Hale, 
Pleas of the Crown (ed. of 1778) 471-475; Foster, Crown 
Law (2d ed. 1791) 259; 1 East, Pleas of the Crown (1803) 
257.) [6] To be an unlawful act within the meaning of 
section 192, therefore, the act in question must be dangerous 
to human life or safety and meet the conditions of section 
20. (See People v. Mitchell, 27 Ca1.2d 678, 682-684 [166 P.2d 
10] ; People v. Pearne, 118 Cal. 154, 158 [50 P. 376] ; Thiede v. 
State, 106 Neb. 48 [182 N.W. 570-572, 15 A.L.R. 237]; 
People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562 [199 N.W. 373, 374, 35 A.L.R. 
741] ; Potter v. State, 162 Ind. 213 [70 N.E. 129, 131, 102 
Am.St.Rep. 198, 64 L.R.A. 942] ; State v. Oope, 204 N.C. 28 
r167 S.E. 456, 458] ; D.j,xon v. State, 104 Miss. 410 [61 So. 
423, 45 L.R.A.N.S. 219].) 
) 
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It follows, therefore, that only if defendant had intention-
ally or through criminal negligence prepared, compounded, 
or sold an adulterated or misbranded drug, would his violation 
of section 26280 of the Health and Safety Code be an unlaw-
ful act ·within the meaning of section 192 of the Penal Code. 
Thus, in People v. Penny, supra, in discussing section 7415 
of the Business and Professions Code, which prohibits the use 
by licensed cosmetologists of a solution of more than 10 per 
cent phenol on a human being, we said that had the defendant 
been a licensed cosmetologist, she would have been guilty 
of violating section 7415 and therefore of an unlawful act 
within the meaning of section 192 of the Penal Code. The 
defendant in that. case knew that she was using such a 
solution. The intentional or criminally negligent use of such 
a solution on a human being by a licensed cosmetologist in 
violation of section 7415 of the Business and Professions Code 
would clearly meet the conditions of section 20 of the Penal 
Code and would therefore be an unlawful act within the 
meaning of section 192. [6] When, as in this case, however, 
the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be 
expected to know, that the sodium citrate bottle contained 
nitrite, those conditions are not met and there is therefore 
lacking the culpability necessary to make the act an unlawful 
act within the meaning of section 192. 
The crucial question with respect to defendant's conviction 
under section 380 of the Penal Code· is whether he "ignor-
antly" deviated from Dr. Goldstein's prescription. The 
attorney general contends that defendant acted "ignorantly" 
because he did not know and was therefore "ignorant" of the 
fact that the sodium citrate bottle contained nitrite, and 
that it is therefore immaterial that he had the professional 
knowledge that one should have to dispense drugs and could 
not reasonably be expected to know that the sodium citrate 
bottle contained nitrite. Defendant, on the other hand, con-
·At the time defendant filled the presllription lelltion 380 provided: 
"Every apothellary, druggist, or person carrying on business as a dealer 
in drugs or medieines, or J;lerson employed as clerk or salesman by Bueh 
person, who, in putting up any drug or medicines, or making up any 
presllription, or filling any order for drugs or medillines, willfully, negli-
gently, or ignorantly omits to label the same, or puts an untrue label, 
stamp, or other designation of contents, upon any box, bottle, or other 
pallkage containing any drugs or medillines, or substitutes a different 
article for any article prescribed or ordered, or puts up a greater or less 
quantity of any article than that presllribed or ordered, or otherwise 
deviates fom the terms of the presllription or order whieh he undertakes 
to follow, in consequence of whieh human life or health is endangered, is 
pllQ- of a JDisc1aneanor. or: if cieath ensues, is .,wt;r of a felaaT." 
) 
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tends that he did not act "ignorantly," since he had the 
knowledge of drugs and the technical skills required to dis-
pense them, that he could not reasonably be expected to know 
that the sodium citrate bottle contained nitrite or to make a 
chemical analysis of its contents before filling the prescription, 
and that since there was nothing to show that he lacked the 
knowledge he was required to have or that he failed to use 
that knowledge, section 380 does not apply. 
A definitive answer to these conflicting contentions cannot 
be gleaned from the dictionary, on which both parties rely, 
for the definitions therein can be read to support either 
contention.1I [7] "When language which is reasonably sus-
ceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily 
that construction which is more favorable to the offender will 
be adopted." (People v. Ralph, 24 Ca1.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 
401].) This rule is particularly pertinent here, where one 
of the proposed constructions would impose absolute criminal 
liability and make a felony of an act that involves no culpa-
bility whatever. We do not base our decision on that ground 
alone, however, for we are convinced that it is clear from the 
history and purpose of section 380 that it did not impose 
criminal liability without fault. 
[8] Section 380 was enacted in 1872 when anyone could 
lawfully sell drugs in this state. It was based on section 
445 of the Penal Code of New York (1864), and a footnote to 
that section, adopted by the California Code Commissioners 
as a note to section 380, stated, "The frequent occurrence 
of accidents, involving, often, even the loss of human life, 
through mistakes in putting up prescriptions, render necessary' 
some legislation to enforce care and caution on the part of 
dealers in drugs." (Italics added.) There was no intimation 
of a purpose to impose criminal liability without fault, and 
the qualifying words of the section "willfully, negligently, 
or ignorantly" belie any such purpose. As the commissioners' 
note indicates, the legislation was designed to enforce "care 
and caution" on the part of dealers in drugs. Obviously a 
-Webster'. New International Dictionary, 2d ed. Unabridged, 1948, 
defines "ignorance" as "want of knowledge in general, or in relation 
to a partieular subject." It defines "ignorant" as .. [d]estitute of knowl-
edge; uninstructed or uninformed ••• [u]ninformed (in); unaware 
(of); as, I am ignorant in this subject; he was ignorant of that tact" 
and states that" [o]ne is ignorant who is without knowledge, whether 
in general or of lome partiC1llar thing." (Italics added.) The italicized 
words lend support to one contention, the remaining words lend 8upport 
to the other. 
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person does not act with "care and caution" who dispenses 
drugs in ignorance of their properties and proper uses, and 
we believe that it was to protect the public against such 
ignorance that section 380 was enacted. 
The Legislature's preoccupation with such ignorance is also 
indicated by its enactment in the same year of the first phar-
macy law in this state designed to confine the dispensing of 
drugs to those of proven knowledge and competency. (Stats. 
1871-1872,p. 681.) This law, known as the San Francisco 
Pharmacy Act, regulated the practice of pharmacy and the 
dispensing of medicines and poisons in the City and County 
of San Francisco. It confined the right to dispense drugs 
or :fill prescriptions to graduate pharmacists, licentiates in 
pharmacy, practicing pharmacists, and practicing assistant 
pharmacists, and prescribed the educational qualifications and 
experience that each must have. This act was repealed in 
1883, but a state-wide act based thereon was enacted in 189!. 
(Stats. 1891, p. 86.) Other legislation followed, and in 1937 
the present state-wide statute for the protection of the public 
against ignorance in the handling of drugs was enacted. (Bus. 
& Prof. Code, §§ 4000-4256, as amended.) In 1955, after the 
alleged offense herein was committed, the Legislature amended 
section 380 by deleting the word "ignorantly" and substi-
tuting therefor "without consideration of those facts which 
by use of ordinary care and skill he should have known." 
This change removed the ambiguity arising from the use of the 
word "ignorantly" and made it abundantly clear that it 
was never the purpose of the statute to impose criminal lia-
bility without fault for accidents having no relation to a 
failure to use the knowledge and skill required for the dis-
pensing of drugs. (See Elbert, Ltd. v. Gross, 41 Cal.2d 322, 
327 [260 P.2d 35], and cases cited.) 
The judgment and order are reversed. 
Gibson, ,C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
